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I. INTRODUCTION
For the second year running, the Florida Legislature has not made
significant changes in its juvenile justice and child welfare systems and
juvenile code, with limited exceptions highlighted in this article. However,
the intermediate appellate courts have been very busy interpreting legislative
changes made in the 1993 and 1994 sessions, as well as continuing a long
standing practice of repeated corrections of simple, regular, and fundamental
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
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errors made by the trial courts. The intermediate appellate courts have been
most active in the areas of delinquency dispositions and terminations of
parental rights. The Supreme Court of Florida was also active this past year,
albeit in interpreting statutory matters more than constitutional questions.
II. DELINQUENCY
A. Detention Issues
Florida's legislative approach to juvenile detention has varied dramati-
cally over the past two decades. Earlier survey articles in this law review
have discussed the state's fluctuating approach to this issue.' Under Florida
law, as it now stands, an intake counselor or case manager employed by the
Department of Juvenile Justice2 ("DJJ") makes the decision whether or not
to detain a child.3 The decision is based upon a risk assessment instrument
("RAI") which is a device developed by the DJJ.4 The RAI is developed
from statutory detention guidelines which are based most significantly upon
the charge against the juvenile.5 The court has discretion to detain a child in
a placement more restrictive than indicated by the results of the risk assess-
ment instrument, but the court must state, in writing, clear and convincing
reasons for such placement.
6
The trial courts have had difficulty interpreting the detention require-
ments. For example, in S.W. v. Woolsey,7 the trial court securely detained a
youngster after an adjudicatory hearing, despite the fact that the RAI
reflected a score which would not allow for secure detention.8 The court
based the post-adjudication secure detention upon the argument that the
finding of adjudication was a change in circumstances and an aggravating
factor which would allow the court to change the level of detention. 9 First,
1. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1995 Survey of Florida Law, 20 NOVA L. REV.
191, 191 n.1 (1995) (citing prior articles that address juvenile detention issues).
2. Effective October 1, 1994, the legislature removed authority from the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services and placed it in a new agency, the Department of Juvenile
Justice. See ch. 94-209, § 1, 1994 Fla. Laws 1183, 1192 (creating FLA. STAT. § 20.316).
3. FLA. STAT. § 39.044(1)(b) (1995).
4. Id. § 39.042(2)(b) (1995).
5. Id. § 39.042(2)(b)1.
6. See id. § 39.044(2)(f).
7. 673 So. 2d 152 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
8. Id. at 153.
9. Id. Section 39.044(9) of the Florida Statutes provides:
[Vol. 21:189
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the appellate court held that the trial court failed to prepare a new RAI,
rescored in compliance with the statute and prior case law.' ° The trial court
had added three points to the original RAI because at trial the child was
found to have committed the charged delinquent act, which the trial court
held was a change of circumstances and an aggravating factor. The appellate
court noted, as a technical matter, that the trial court does not prepare the
RAI, but rather the case manager, an employee of DJJ, does." However,
more importantly, the fact that the child was found to have committed the
delinquent act with which she was charged was not a changed circumstance
as contemplated by the law.1 2 Changed circumstances, by definition, are
circumstances not taken into account in the preparation of the original RAI.'3
Obviously, the delinquent act with which the child was charged had been
taken into account in the preparation of the original RAT.' 4 In fact, the
appellate court explained that the RAI compilation presumes that the act
charged was committed and the points are accordingly assigned. 5 To allow
additional points to be assigned for an act, after the finding had been made
that the act was committed, would result in a double score for the same
event. The court rejected this interpretation and reversed. 16
M.L.F. v. State17 is an example of a case in which the trial court sought
to use post-adjudication secure detention, although it lacked the authority to
hold the child in secure detention, because neither the RAI nor any other
statutory criteria supported the placement. 8  When the child's attorney
objected to the secure detention, which was based upon an RAI score of only
two points, resulting from several second degree misdemeanor adjudications,
but had no other statutory basis, the trial court cavalierly commented as
follows:
If a child is on release status and not detained pursuant to this section, the
child may be placed into secure, nonsecure, or home detention care only pursu-
ant to a court hearing in which the original risk assessment instrument, rescored
based on newly discovered evidence or changed circumstances with the results
recommending detention, is introduced into evidence.
FLA. STAT. § 39.044(9).
10. S.W., 673 So. 2d at 154-55 (citing C.M.T. v. Soud, 662 So. 2d 1382 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1995)); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.044(9).
11. S.W., 673 So. 2d at 155.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. S.W., 673 So. 2d at 155.
17. 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1224 (1st Dist. Ct. App. May 20, 1996).
18. Id. at D1224.
Dale
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Well, we're going to give the legislature something to think
about and chew on and so forth, some of these edicts and so forth.
They might just feel that's an inherent power of the court to do that
and think it's wonderful legislation. I think what the state and [the
Department of Juvenile Justice representative] said makes a lot of
sense. I wish I could do it even longer. [Appellant], you will be in
secure[] detention for fifteen working days and the Court will
waive the RAI assessment that has been found to have some sig-
nificance by some other courts and [you] will be in secure deten-
tion for fifteen working days for the reasons that were outlined by
[the Department of Juvenile Justice representative], and then home
detention with a monitor after the fifteen working days. 19
The appellate court held that continued detention after adjudication is
only premised upon a finding that it was initially permissible. 20 The child's
RAI did not support placement in secure detention, and none of the statutory
requirements in the Florida Statutes which would permit a court to order
placement more restrictive than that indicated by the RAI, existed.2' Finally,
the court's statement, that the fact that the appellant child had no home to go
to was grounds for detention, is explicitly prohibited by the Florida law.22
Because there are fewer detention facilities in Florida than there are
judicial circuits, occasionally a youngster will be placed in a secure deten-
tion facility located in one judicial circuit, by a court sitting in another
circuit. The issue that arose in T.O. v. Alachua Regional Juvenile Detention
23Center, was whether it was proper for the child to bring a writ of habeas
corpus, challenging the legality of his pre-trial detention within the jurisdic-
tion of the appellate court where he was held in a detention center but where
the appellate court did not have jurisdiction over the trial court that ordered
the detention. 24 The appellate court held that the writ of habeas corpus was
appropriate, given its purpose of determining the legality of the restraint
under which the person is held.2 In such a proceeding, the person named
respondent is the individual holding custody and the one in a position to
physically produce the petitioner. The judge entering the detention order
19. Id. at D1224-25 (alteration in original).
20. Id. at D1225.
21. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 39.044(2)(a)-(f).
22. M.L.F., 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D1225. See FLA. STAT. § 39.043(l)(d) (1995).
23. 668 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 676 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1996).
24. Id. at 244.
25. Id. at 245.
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26
was not a proper respondent. More significantly, a court only has authority
to issue a writ of habeas corpus directed to a person within its judicial
jurisdiction.27 The court therefore ruled that the Fifth District Court of
Appeal did not have jurisdiction and found a violation of the detention
statute by the trial court, entitling the juvenile to relief.2 The court recog-
nized that the use of regional detention centers in Florida might result in the
jurisdictional issue being presented again, and for that reason, the court
certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida.
29
In 1994, the legislature amended the juvenile code to allow for post-
adjudication punishment using detention as an alternative. 30  The statute
provides a mandatory period of detention of five days in a secure detention
facility as well as the performance of 100 hours of community service if
there has been a finding of a commission of a first offense that involves the
use or possession of a firearm.3 In T.A. v. Wimberly,32 the child filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the court's order detaining the
child without awaiting the scheduling of a formal disposition hearing or the
preparation of a pre-disposition report. 33 While the statute itself does not
provide explicit guidance, the appellate court nonetheless construed the law
to provide that the imposition of the mandatory five day detention punish-
ment must occur after a formal disposition hearing with a pre-disposition
report.34 Significantly, the court also recognized that, given the time frame
in which the punishment is served, this is the kind of case that is capable of
repetition and likely to evade review.35 The result would be that if the court
were to allow the full period of the penalty to be served before an appeal
could be perfected, this would reasonably be seen as effectively eliminating
the right of appellate review.36 The court, thus, decided the issue.
26. Id. at 244.
27. Id.
28. T.O., 668 So. 2d at 244-45.
29. Id. at 245.
30. See FLA. STAT. § 790.22(9) (1995).
31. See id. § 790.22(9)(a) (providing "[flor a first offense, that the minor serve a manda-
tory period of detention of 5 days in a secure detention facility and perform 100 hours of
community service"); see also Dale, supra note 1, at 203.
32. 660 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
33. Id. at 1131.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1132.
36. Id.
Dale
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B. Trial Issues
Children, like adults, sometimes come before the juvenile court and a
claim is made that they are incompetent to stand trial for the charge of
juvenile delinquency. The question before the Fourth District Court of
Appeal in T.L. v. State,37 was whether the DJJ may be ordered by the court to
provide treatment in restoring a juvenile's competency so that the child may
stand trial in delinquency proceedings. 38 In T.L., the parties agreed that the
child did not meet the criteria for involuntary hospitalization although the
court also found that the child was not competent to proceed to trial. 39 The
trial court concluded that it lacked the authority to mandate either the DJJ or
the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") to provide
services to the child.4° First, the trial court held that the DJJ had no authority
to provide the services because there was no statute or rule obligating the
DJJ to look after a child until the youngster had been adjudicated delin-
quent.41 The trial court also declined to order HRS to provide the treatment
because the Florida law governing involuntary commitment of defendants
who are adjudicated incompetent to stand trial or incompetent for sentenc-
ing42 did not apply to juveniles as juvenile proceedings were governed solely
by the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure and chapter 39.43 Therefore, the
trial court ordered the two agencies to "work together," 44 whatever that
might mean. Then, as reported by the appellate court, the DJJ made a
referral to HRS, and it appeared that HRS would not provide the services
recommended without a court order.45 The child appealed.46
37. 670 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
38. Id. at 172.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 173.
41. Id.
42. See FLA. STAT. § 916.13 (1995).
43. T.L., 670 So. 2d at 173 (citing Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v.
A.E., 667 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)). The court in A.E. held that section 916 of
the Florida Statutes is inapplicable to juvenile proceedings and the juvenile court cannot order
an involuntary commitment of juveniles. A.E., 667 So. 2d at 429. The A.E. court further held
that proceedings should be commenced under sections 39.046, 394.467, and 393.11, and if the
child does not meet the involuntary commitment standards, the appropriate relief should be
ordered pursuant to Rule 8.095 of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure. Id. at 429-30.
44. T.L, 670 So. 2d at 173.
45. Id.
46. Id.
[Vol. 21:189
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The appellate court did not do much to resolve the matter. It did find
that the DJJ, by statute after 199447 was responsible for matters involving
juvenile crime before, during, and after formal proceedings are initiated.48 It
further found that the DJJ's budget included costs for contracting with HRS
to provide evaluations, therapy services, and other services for juveniles
charged with felonies who are found to be mentally incompetent to proceed
through the adjudicatory process.49 Furthermore, the court found that HRS
is responsible for administering mental health provisions under chapter 394
of the Florida Statutes, and this includes children who have not yet been
found delinquent.50 Indeed, the juvenile code does provide that if it is
necessary to place a child in a residential facility for services the procedures
and criteria established in chapter 394 are to be used.5 1 The appellate court
found that the statutory scheme requires "interplay between the agencies.'
52
The appellate court remanded the case back to the trial court because the
trial court failed to comply with Rule 8.095 of the Florida Rules of Juvenile
Procedure, which provides that if a child is incompetent to stand trial but
does not meet the criteria for involuntary hospitalization, the trial court shall
order the "'appropriate nondelinquent treatment for the child in order to
restore the child's competence to proceed with an adjudicatory hearing."' 5 3
Because HRS was not a party to the proceedings, the appellate court did not
resolve the dispute between the two agencies as a matter of law.54 Rather, it
ordered the trial court to bring both agencies before it for resolution. 55 The
opinion does nothing to clarify what should happen when both agencies are
before the trial court.
It seems quite clear that the trial court has the power to order the
agencies to resolve their administrative differences and work out an agree-
ment to care for this category of children. Unfortunately, however, it is
common in Florida that the state agencies are unable to administratively
resolve their differences. As a result, the agencies appear before the trial
47. See FLA. STAT. § 39.0206 (1995).
48. T.L., 670 So. 2d at 173. See generally FLA. STAT. § 20.316(1)(b) (1995).
49. T.L., 670 So. 2d at 173.
50. Id. at 173-74.
51. Id. at 174 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.046(2) (1995)). Section 39.046(2) provides that the
"procedures and criteria established in chapter 393, chapter 394, or chapter 397, whichever is
applicable, shall be used." FLA. STAT. § 39.046(2).
52. T.L, 670 So. 2d at 174.
53. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.095(a)(4)(A)).
54. Id.
55. Id.
Dale
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courts, and ultimately the appellate courts, for failure to carry out statutory
mandates based upon the agencies' belief that the statutory mandates do not
apply to them. This is a long standing problem that has been before the
appellate courts on a number of occasions. 6
C. Adjudicatory Issues
The problem of violence in the schools has received substantial cover-
age in the media and academic circles. 7 Students who commit violent acts
are subject to school disciplinary action 58 and charges of juvenile delin-
quency. In addition, fully independent of chapter 39 and its juvenile delin-
quency provisions, the State of Florida has enacted a statutory civil cause of
action for a protective injunction in cases of repeat violence.59  Alleged
victims of violence may obtain a protective injunction to stop further acts of
violence if they prove the existence of two incidents of violence or stalking
committed by the respondent, one of which must have been within six
months of the filing of the petition, which were directed toward the peti-
tioner or the petitioner's immediate family. 6° In H.K. v. Vocelle,61 a fifteen-
year-old high school student filed a petition for an injunction against
repeated violence seeking protection from a seventeen-year-old classmate
who had physically attacked her on school grounds. 62  The trial court
dismissed the petition on the grounds that chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes
had preempted the repeat violence injunction statute.63 The appellate court
concluded that the civil provisions of the injunction statute applied both to
adult and juvenile respondents.64 The court found that the injunctive action
56. See Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. State, 655 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Kahn, 639 So. 2d 689
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). Sometimes the agency is correct that there is no authority to
obligate them to act. See Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Jones, 631 So. 2d
348 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Ortiz,
627 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
57. See Jonathan Wren, Alternative Schools for Disruptive Youths: A Cure For What Ails
School Districts Plagued by Violence?, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 307 (1995); Allison C.
Gregory, Officers to Patrol Schools, THE HERALD, June 20, 1996, at Al; Violence in the
Schools, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 25, 1996, at 24.
58. See MICHAEL J. DALE, REPRESENTING THE CHILD CuENT 6-32 (1996).
59. See FLA. STAT. § 784.046(1)(b) (1995).
60. Id.
61. 667 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
62. Id. at 892.
63. Id
64. Id.
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was not penal in nature.65 Furthermore, the injunction statute was not
limited to adults and was drafted with the recognition that such relief could
be sought whether or not any other petition, complaint, or cause of action
was currently available or pending between the parties.66 Finally, the
appellate court concluded that even had the trial court been correct that such
relief was only available in a delinquency proceeding in juvenile court, there
was no lack of jurisdiction because the juvenile court was simply a different
administrative division of the circuit court. 67 The appellate court reversed on
the merits, allowing the cause of action to proceed. 68
D. Dispositional Issues
Florida, like all other states, employs a two-part procedure in juvenile
delinquency cases: the adjudicatory stage, discussed earlier, and the dispo-
sitional stage.69 Dispositional hearings are governed by section 39.052(4) of
the Florida Statutes which, at first glance, does not appear to be a compli-
cated law.70 Among the variety of dispositional alternatives provided in
chapter 39 are restitution, community control, and commitment to various
facilities which, in major part, are based upon increasing deprivation of
liberty.71 However, the law has generated a plethora of reported opinions
over the past decade. Among the issues regularly before the appellate
courts, have been whether and if so, how much discretion the court has in
making dispositional decisions, whether the court may change its disposi-
tional decision, and how the adult court chooses to treat a child before that
court for dispositional purposes.
As part of the juvenile delinquency dispositional process, Florida law
requires the court to consider a pre-disposition report.72  The juvenile may
65. Id. at 893.
66. H.K., 667 So. 2d at 893. A new federal statute available to challenge general vio-
lence, as well as school violence, is the 1994 Violence Against Women Act. See 42 U.S.C. §
13981 (1994).
67. H.K., 667 So. 2d at 893.
68. Id.
69. See generally MARK SOLER ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT 5-54 to -90
(1996).
70. See FLA. STAT. § 39.052(4) (1995).
71. See id. § 39.054(1)(a) (1995).
72. Section 39.052(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes provides that the report:
shall indicate and report the child's priority needs, recommendations as to a clas-
sification of risk for the child in the context of his or her program and supervi-
sion needs, and a plan for treatment that recommends the most appropriate
Dale
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waive the report requirement, but by supreme court decision, the trial court
must advise the child of his or her rights under the statute and confirm that
the juvenile understands the significance of the waiver of the right to the pre-
disposition report.73 In Lunn v. State,74 the Second District Court of Appeal
held that, while a child may execute a written waiver of the right to a pre-
disposition report, the trial court must question the child personally to
explain his or her rights under chapter 39.75 Failure to do so is reversible
error.
76
Florida law also provides that the court shall provide the reasons for
adjudicating the child delinquent and committing him in writing. The court
must also consider the Department's placement and restrictiveness level
recommendation for the child which, if the court disregards it, the court shall
state its reasons on the record.78 In J.E.W. v. State,79 a child appealed an
adjudication of delinquency after pleading no contest to charges of petty and
grand theft.80 The DJJ subsequently recommended that the disposition be
continued until the child underwent a psychiatric evaluation so that the
agency could complete a pre-disposition report which would contain place-
ment and other recommendations and a treatment plan. Despite the fact that
the DJJ advised the court that the psychiatric evaluation was pending, and
despite the further fact that the Department had not completed the pre-
disposition report, the trial court, incredibly, adjudicated the child delinquent
and then sentenced him to a moderate risk residential level placement
without reducing its order to writing.8' The appellate court held that the
failure to comply with the statutory provisions was reversible error.82 In so
doing, the court referred to a virtual litany of prior appellate court opinions
placement setting to meet the child's needs with the minimum program security
that reasonably ensures public safety.
Id. § 39.052(4)(a).
73. See State v. Berry, 647 So. 2d 830, 832 (Fla. 1994).
74. 675 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
75. Id. at 648.
76. Id.
77. FLA. STAT. § 39.052(4)(e)1; see also Lunn, 675 So. 2d at 648; Thomas v. State, 662
So. 2d 1334, 1335-36 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
78. See FLA. STAT. § 39.052(4)(e)2-3.
79. 672 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
80. Id. at 73.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 73-74.
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and stated that strict statutory compliance in dispositional hearings is
required under Florida law.
8 3
In Nation v. State,84 the First District Court of Appeal was also faced
with the lack of entry of a written order.85 In that case, the court provided
the trial court with guidance on how to solve the problem of a failure to
make a written report, holding that a written nunc pro tunc sentencing order
86would satisfy the statutory requirements. The court found that a new
sentencing hearing was not required and that is was not necessary that the
child be physically present in court for the ministerial act of entering a
written order conforming to the oral pronouncement of the court.8 7
A juvenile respondent's right to maintain innocence, even at the
dispositional stage of a juvenile delinquency case, was before the Third
District Court of Appeal recently in A.S. v. State.88 In A.S., the child was
charged with the commission of an aggravated battery with a deadly weapon
upon another juvenile.89 The respondent denied the charges and an adjudi-
catory hearing followed in which the child was ultimately adjudicated by the
court to be delinquent as charged. At the dispositional hearing, HRS
recommended that the child not be committed but that he receive a with-
holding of adjudication and be ordered to perform twenty hours of commu-
nity service. The State objected, urging that the juvenile be adjudicated and
committed to a level six facility. A level six facility is a moderate risk
residential facility involving twenty-four hour awake supervision for
youngsters who do not need placement in facilities which are physically
secure.90 The trial court committed the child to a level four juvenile group
treatment home to be followed by fifty hours of community service and
reserved jurisdiction on the issue of restitution to the victim.91 The appellate
court found that the trial court made it clear on the record that its disposition
was significantly influenced by the child's continued protestation of inno-
83. Id. at 73 (citing B.B. v. State, 647 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); M.H. v.
State, 621 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); R.G.S. v. State, 597 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1992); H.L.L. v. State, 595 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992); T.S.J. v.
State, 439 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
84. 668 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
85. Id. at 285.
86. Id. at 286.
87. Id.; see also Bridgewater v. State, 21 Fla. L. Weekly D584 (1st Dist. Ct. App. March
5, 1996).
88. 667 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
89. Id. at 995.
90. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(59)(c) (1995).
91. A.S., 667 So. 2d at 995.
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cence to the charge.92 The appellate court reversed on the basis of the 1968
United States Supreme Court opinion in United States v. Jackson,93 which
held that a judicially imposed penalty which needlessly discourages the
articulation of one's Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty, and which
deters exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial, is
patently unconstitutional.94 The court also relied upon Holton v. State,95 a
Supreme Court of Florida case which held that a trial court violated a
defendant's due process rights by using the protestation of innocence against
the defendant at the trial, as well as during the penalty phase of a criminal
proceeding.96 The appellate court in A.S. reversed, finding that the choice of
plea should never have been a factor in the dispositional decision.97
Of course, the trial court has the power to enter a dispositional order
which is at odds with the predisposition report prepared by DJJ.9 8 The issue
before the Third District Court of Appeal in J.M. v. State,99 was first,
whether a child had a right to appeal from a disposition committing him to
the DJJ's custody and second, what is the standard of review of a court's
departure from an agency recommendation."'0 On the first question, despite
a long dissent by Judge Cope, 01 the majority held that both on the basis of
statutory construction and constitutional interpretation, the child had a right
of appeal.102 The problem which gave rise to the dissent was language in the
dispositional statute which stated that it was the intent of the legislature that
the criteria set forth in the general guideline section are to be followed at the
discretion of the court and are not mandatory procedural requirements in a
dispositional hearing.10 3 The majority read the section narrowly to the effect
that the legislature had not intended to create an appealable issue out of the
fact that the trial court considered only certain criteria and not others in the
list of the factors to be used to determine suitability or non-suitability for
92. Il
93. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
94. 1& at 581.
95. 573 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Holton v. Florida, 500 U.S. 960
(1991).
96. Id. at 292.
97. A.S., 667 So. 2d at 996.
98. See FLA. STAT. § 39.052(4)(e)3.
99. 677 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
100. Id. at 891-92.
101. Id. at 893-903 (Cope, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 892.
103. Id. at 891 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.052(3)(k) (1993)). This subsection was later
renumbered as (4)(k). See FLA. STAT. § 39.052(4)(k).
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adjudication and commitment of the child to the DJJ.1°4 More significantly,
the court held that if the child did not have a right to appeal the disposition,
serious state and federal constitutional rights would be implicated. 05 The
court quite properly noted that "[tihe commitment of a child to HRS is a
deprivation of liberty which triggers significant due process protection under
both the federal and Florida constitutions. '' 106 The court concluded that if
juveniles had no right to appeal dispositions then the child in this case would
have been forced to serve an increased sentence as a result of the exercise of
a fundamental constitutional right. 10 7  The court concluded this was
"unfathomable."
10
Another dispositional area that has given the trial courts a great deal of
trouble has been the procedure by which the criminal court decides whether
to treat a juvenile convicted as an adult, a juvenile, or a youthful offender for
purposes of imposition of sanctions.1°9 Prior survey articles have discussed
the case law in this area in depth." 0
In Ritchie v. State,' the Supreme Court of Florida was asked to decide
the following certified question:
WHETHER A CHILD, CHARGED WITH AN OFFENSE PUN-
ISHABLE BY DEATH OR LIFE IMPRISONMENT, BUT
FOUND GUILTY OF A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE,
PUNISHABLE BY A TERM OF YEARS NOT EXCEEDING
LIFE, MUST BE SENTENCED AS AN ADULT WITHOUT THE
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS AFFORDED BY SECTION
39.059(7)(c), FLORIDA STATUTES?" 2
The court held that under the facts of the case the child was indicted for one
offense but convicted of a lesser included offense, which was also punish-
104. J.M., 677 So. 2d at 891-92; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.052(4)(d).
105. J.M., 677 So. 2d at 892.
106. Id. (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(a) (1995). Thejuvenile may waive the right to challenge the
trial court's decision to sentence him as an adult. See Norris v. State, 659 So. 2d 1352, 1354
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
110. See, e.g., Dale, supra note 1.
I 11. 670 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 1996).
112. Id. at 925.
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able by death or life imprisonment, and therefore, the child was properly
sentenced as an adult without the procedures afforded in chapter 39. '3
Justice Anstead dissented as a matter of statutory construction.' 4 The
controversy concerned the interpretation of the then existing section
39.022(5)(c)3 of the Florida Statutes.115 This statute provides that:
If the child is found to have committed the offense punishable
by death or life imprisonment, the child shall be sentenced as an
adult. If the child is not found to have committed the indictable of-
fense but is found to have committed a lesser included offense or
any other offense for which he was indicated as a part of the crimi-
nal episode, the court may sentence [the child as a juvenile.]" 6
Justice Anstead argued that the statute must be read as written and that the
word "the" in the statute does not mean "an."'" 7 Thus, "[t]he statute clearly
states that a child is not to be automatically sentenced as an adult when the
child is not found to have committed the indictable offense," according to
Justice Anstead. 8 He concluded that, while there is a disparity in treatment
possible by providing greater procedural protections to a person indicted for
a more severe offense and convicted of a lesser charge than a person indicted
and convicted of a less severe offense, the court is not in a position to
rewrite the statute "as the majority has done here."' 9
By statute, effective October 1, 1994, the Florida Legislature relieved
the trial courts of the burden of making specific written findings for the
imposition of an adult sentence as opposed to a juvenile sentence when the
juvenile is tried as an adult. 20 Prior to that date, the courts were required to
make detailed specific written findings justifying the imposition of the adult
sentence.' 21 Under the new law, the court does not need to articulate specific
findings or enumerate criteria. 22 In two recent cases, the Florida appellate
113. Id. at 928; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7).
114. Ritchie, 670 So. 2d at 928-29 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
115. FLA. STAT. § 39.022(5)(c)3 (1993).
116. Id.
117. Ritchie, 670 So. 2d at 928 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(d).
121. See Dale, supra note 1, at 201-02 (discussing the changes in the law).
122. See id. at 202 (criticizing this change).
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courts were asked to decide whether post-October 1994 orders complied
with the new statute.12
In Grayson v. State,124 the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a
juvenile's sentence as an adult because the trial court did not comply with
the recently amended section 39.059(7)(d).1 5 In that case, a sixteen-year-
old at the time of the crime, was tried as an adult and found guilty of
manslaughter with a firearm and sentenced as an adult to twenty years of
incarceration. 26 Before the sentence, the amendment to section 39.059(7)
went into effect. Based upon decisions in Lutz v. State127 and Thomas v.
State,128 the trial court was correct to retroactively apply the amended
statute. However, the State conceded that the trial court did not sentence the
youngster in accordance with the amended statute. The amended statute
retains most of the provisions of earlier law including the receipt and
consideration of a pre-sentence investigation report from the DJJ which
evaluates the suitability of the youngster for disposition as an adult, a
juvenile, or a youthful offender, 129 and a written order. 30 The appellate
court held that, while the current statute does not require the trial court to
make specific findings in writing, the trial court must nonetheless consider
the statutory criteria to determine what kind of sanctions should be im-
posed. 3' While the statute contains a presumption that the court's decision
to sentence a juvenile as an adult is appropriate, 32 there must be a writing
imposing the adult sanctions. Here there was none. The court reversed. 33
In Roberts v. State,134 the appellate court reversed the lower court's
decision on the grounds that no order of any kind was prepared or filed
under the new statute. 35 Judge Sharp concurred, agreeing that the absence
of any written order imposing adult sanctions required reversal and re-
123. Roberts v. State, 677 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Grayson v. State, 671
So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
124. 671 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
125. Id. at 856.
126. Id. at 855.
127. 664 So. 2d 1060, 1061 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
128. 662 So. 2d 1334, 1336 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
129. FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(a).
130. See Collins v. State, 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1400 (2d Dist. Ct. App. June 12, 1996).
131. Grayson, 671 So. 2d at 856.
132. FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(d).
133. Grayson, 671 So. 2d at 856.
134. 677 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
135. Id. at 2.
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mand.136  He also raised the important issue of whether the court was
obligated to consider a pre-sentence report. 37 Agreeing with the court in
Grayson, he would have found that the imposition of adult sanctions none-
theless obligates the trial court to consider the relevant statutory criteria even
if it is not written into the order.138 Further, in Sharp's view, an order
incorporating at least some of the considerations under the statute and the
recommendations is reviewable by the appellate court. 139 Finally, Judge
Sharp addressed the trial court's primary complaint which dealt with the
"inefficacy" of the juvenile justice system, wherein the trial court apparently
decided on adult sanctions because of its view that the juvenile system was
bankrupt.140 Judge Sharp responded by stating:
Query whether the inadequacy of the juvenile justice system is an
appropriate reason to impose adult sanctions on a fourteen-year-
old, and query whether society will be made safer by having Rob-
erts locked up in an adult prison, only to be released, untreated and
uncounseled, but older and wiser, in less than (probably) four
years. It is a scary thought.'
4
'
Under Florida law, once a juvenile has been transferred for adult
prosecution by means of voluntary waiver, involuntary waiver, or criminal
information in the adult court and after the child has been found to have
committed the adult offense, the child is to be treated as an adult for any
subsequent offenses. 42 In T.L.P. v. State,'43 the appellate court ruled that a
juvenile, who had committed the acts upon which the juvenile charges were
based before she was found to have committed unrelated offenses for which
she was tried as an adult, could not be sentenced under the adult sentencing
statute, and therefore, the court reversed. 44 The juvenile offenses were not
subsequent violations for the purposes of the statute.1
45
Another requirement of section 39.059 governing juveniles who are
before adult court is the provision that juveniles must be notified that they
136. Id. (Sharp, J., concurring).
137. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(a).
138. Roberts, 677 So. 2d at 2 (Sharp, J., concurring).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 3.
142. Thomas v. State, 657 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
143. 657 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
144. Id. at 50.
145. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.022(5)(d) (1993)).
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have the right to a trial court determination of the suitability of imposing
adult sanctions by considering the criteria enumerated in this section.146 In
Figueroa v. State,147 a child appealed his conviction after the trial court
accepted his plea without informing him of his rights under section
39.059(7). 148 By failing to advise the child of the rights that were waived by
the plea, the youngster did not have a full understanding of the plea, and the
waiver of the rights was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. 49 The
appellate court therefore reversed, granting the child's subsequent motions to
withdraw his pleas. 50
Interpreting the rules by which the courts may change dispositional
orders in delinquency cases has also proved difficult for the courts. An
opinion by the Supreme Court of Florida has recently clarified matters. The
issue in State v. M.C.,15 1 was whether Rule 3.800(b)(2) of the Florida Rules
of Criminal Procedure which provides the trial court with authority to
modify a sentence within sixty days of its imposition applies in juvenile
delinquency cases. 52 The supreme court held that it did not. 53 The court
found that the purpose of the juvenile and adult rules were different. 54
However, the court held that although a juvenile in Florida is not considered
a criminal defendant, and thus, the Rules of Criminal Procedure do not apply
to juveniles, juveniles ought to be accorded the same basic rights to finality
and certainty in sentencing as adults.155 Therefore, the court upheld the
proposition that a modification to a sentence, including the imposition of
restitution, should occur within sixty days of sentencing as provided by the
Rules of Criminal Procedure.'5 6
More recently in T.R. v. State,'57 the supreme court was presented with
a similar question of the authority to modify juvenile sentences. 58 In T.R.,
the trial court committed the juvenile to HRS' low risk residential program.
The State subsequently moved to modify the commitment, stating that the
146. See Dunnavant v. State, 665 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
147. 657 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
148. Id. at 1226.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 666 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1995).
152. Id. at 878; see also FLA. R. CmiM. P. 3.800(b).
153. M.C., 666 So. 2d at 878.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. See also L.N.H. v. State, 670 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
157. 677 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1996).
158. Id. at 270-71.
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low risk level was not available for juveniles convicted of aggravated
battery. The juvenile claimed on appeal that the court was without jurisdic-
tion to modify the order, relying on a 1981 case, D.W.J. v. State.159 The
supreme court held that the statutory provision at issue' 60 allowed trial courts
to modify or set aside orders without reference to any time limit. 16' The
juvenile claimed that a separate section of the Florida Statutes set a sixty-
day window after an order was entered within which to suspend a commit-
ment order and place a child on probation or in community control and that
the applicable section of the Florida Statutes should apply to this case.
62
The court distinguished M.C., holding that in M.C., the issue was whether a
trial court could enter an order more than sixty days after the sentence was
imposed which, for the first time would require the juvenile to pay restitu-
tion. 1 63 In T.R., the supreme court recognized that the trial court was not
imposing a sentence for the first time, but was modifying a sentence already
imposed.' 64 Therefore, the court disapproved the holding in D.W.J. and
upheld the modification of the commitment order.
65
In W.E. V. State,166 a child challenged a trial court amendment of an
original sentence to include community control in the form of restitution. 67
Initially, the trial court withheld adjudication and ordered counseling,
enrollment in a particular school program, all costs, and a public defender
lien.168 There was no order regarding restitution. Twenty days later a
hearing was held on the State's motion to amend the sentence. The trial
court granted the motion amending the sentence to include community
control so that the victim's seventy-five dollars unreimbursed medical bill
could be ordered as part of community control. 69 The appellate court ruled
explicitly that the trial court had no authority to amend the sentence to
include additional sanctions when the original sentence was a legal one.170
159. 397 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
160. See FLA. STAT. § 39.054(1), (3).
161. T.R., 677 So. 2d at 271.
162. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 39.054(3).
163. T.R., 677 So. 2d at 272.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 658 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
167. Id at 1178.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. d.
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C.M. v. State171 is a similar case. Here, a trial court ordered an increase
in the original sentence from a juvenile service program to community
control. 72 The appellate court held that the trial court could not increase an
otherwise legal sentence.173 In C.M., the court withheld adjudication and
ordered the child to enter and successfully complete the Juvenile Alternative
Services Program ("JASP") and to pay reasonable restitution. 174 Several
days later the State filed a motion for re-determination of sentence arguing
that the sentence was illegal because restitution could only be ordered when
the child was committed to HRS or placed on community control. The trial
court agreed, increasing the sentence and the child appealed. 175 The appel-
late court held that under Florida law the trial court has the authority to
impose restitution as a part of a community based sanction when adjudica-
tion has been withheld. 76 Thus, the original disposition made by the court
ordering completion of community-based JASP and restitution was proper.
177
Because the original sentence was legal, the court did not have authority to
increase that legal sentence.
178
Another possible condition of community control is the imposition of a
curfew. In A.B.C. v. State,179 a juvenile appealed from an order imposing a
7:00 p.m. curfew on the technical grounds that the curfew was contained in
the written order but was not orally pronounced at the adjudicatory hear-
ing.180 There is a conflict in the case law between the A.B.C. decision and
the decision in S.W. v. State.18' In the latter case, the appellate court struck
down the condition of a juvenile's community control which required sixty
hours of community service because that general condition was not orally
pronounced although the community service is an allowable condition by
statute.
8 2
Many municipalities around the country have recently enacted juvenile
curfew ordinances in an effort to control juvenile behavior and reduce
171. 658 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
172. Id. at 1179.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. C.M., 658 So. 2d at 1179.
177. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.052(3) (1993)).
178. IdL
179. 673 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
180. Id. at 966.
181. 666 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
182. Id at 600.
19
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crime.183 In January 1994, the Dade County Commission enacted a juvenile
curfew ordinance. 184 In Metropolitan Dade County v. Pred,185 the appellate
court heard an appeal from a circuit court decision which found the ordi-
nance unconstitutional in violation of the Florida Constitution.186  The
appellate court reversed, finding none of the challenges to the ordinance
meritorious. 187 The court found that juveniles are always subject to some
form of custody and the state has the constitutional power to regulate matters
for the well being of children. 88 The appellate court, without any detailed
discussion, concluded that because children due to their special nature and
vulnerabilities "do not enjoy the same quantum or quality of rights as
adults," the ordinance did not violate any of their rights under the Florida
Constitution.
189
A child and his parent have the right to speak at a dispositional hearing.
In A.P. v. State,'90 the Second District Court of Appeal analyzed the trial
court's refusal to allow the child or his mother to address the court and the
lower court's placement of the youngster on community control.' 9' The
appellate court recognized that given the serious nature of the charges,
nothing either the parent or the child would have said would have affected
the disposition. 92  However, the Florida Statutes provide that prior to
determining and announcing the disposition the trial court shall give the
parties an opportunity to comment on the issue of disposition and rehabilita-
tion. 193 The court further recognized that the proceeding may be one which
will "create a lasting impression of fair and impartial justice" and that this
may be best effectuated by allowing the parties to be heard.'
9 4
183. See SOLERET AL., supra note 69, at 3-41.
184. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla., Ordinance 94-1 (Jan. 18, 1994).
185. 665 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
186. Id. at 253.
187. Id.
188. Id. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984); Griffin v. State, 396 So. 2d 152,
155 (Fla. 1981).
189. Metropolitan Dade County, 665 So. 2d at 253. See also Qutb v. Strauss, I1 F.3d
488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Qutb v. Bartlett, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994); In re
Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. JT9065297, 887 P.2d 599 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)
(containing detailed analysis).
190. 666 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
191. Id. at 211.
192. Id.
193. See FLA. STAT. § 39.052(3)(c)4 (1993).
194. A.P., 666 So. 2d at 211.
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E. Appellate Issues
The Florida Juvenile Code allows the trial courts to use contempt as a
means of enforcing disposition orders. In A.L.B. v. State,195 a child appealed
from a contempt finding which was based upon the trial court's issuance of
an order to show cause, sua sponte, as to why the child should not be held in
contempt for faliure to abide by a court order placing him on community
control. 96 Among the issues raised on appeal was whether the court had
authority to enter the order to show cause, sua sponte, under the facts of the
case.' 97 Rule 8.150(b)(1) of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure
provides that the court on its own motion or upon affidavit of any person
having knowledge of the facts may issue and sign an order to show cause in
a contempt proceeding.198 Without any analysis, the court simply concluded
that the record in the case reflected the statement of the trial judge that the
basis of the order to show cause was upon his own motion and the sworn
petition alleging violation of community control. 199 Judge Webster dis-
sented.200 He concluded that the record showed that the order to show cause
was issued at the request of the child's community control counselor.201
Judge Webster could find nothing in the Florida Rules of Juvenile Proce-
dure to explain what it meant for a judge on his or her own motion to issue
the order to show cause.202 Therefore, Judge Webster looked to the analo-
gous rules of criminal procedure and case law and concluded that the order
to show cause was based upon statements by a person who was not under
oath who lacked personal knowledge of the matters about which he was
20commenting, and thus, were hearsay statements. 03 In Judge Webster's view,
the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure require an affidavit from a person
having knowledge of the facts, and here there was none.204 Nor did he see
how the order to show cause could have been issued on the court's own
motion.20 5 Although research disclosed no case on point, research on the
language of the analogous criminal procedure rule disclosed that a judge
195. 675 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
196. Id. at 669.
197. Id.
198. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.150(b)(1).
199. A.L.B., 675 So. 2d at 670.
200. Id. (Webster, J., dissenting).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 671.
203. Id.
204. A.L.B., 675 So. 2d at 671.
205. Id. at 672.
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may issue an order to show cause on the judge's own motion provided that
he or she has heard sworn testimony which, if true, would support an
adjudication of indirect criminal contempt. 2°6 Here the alleged contempt
occurred outside the presence of the judge, and the judge had no independent
knowledge regarding the facts. Finally, to allow the court on its own motion
to issue an order to show cause for a criminal contempt without supporting
evidence under oath would "permit the courts to engage in star chamber
proceedings, in complete disregard of the due process requirements impli-
cated by such serious charges. 2 °7
An interesting question of how much restitution may be ordered in light
of the order of adjudication was before the First District Court of Appeal in
J.O.S. v. State.208 In that case, a child was ordered to pay restitution of
$1,092 after an adjudication that he committed what would have been an
offense of second degree misdemeanor criminal mischief for which as an
adult the maximum amount of restitution was $200. The State had filed a
petition alleging a first degree misdemeanor where the damage of the
property was greater than $200 but less than $1,000. At the adjudicatory
hearing, the State offered no evidence regarding the dollar value of the
damage and as a result the court made a finding of criminal mischief, a
second degree misdemeanor.20 9 At the restitution hearing, the court heard
testimony and issued an order in the amount of $1,092 from which the child
appealed.210 The appellate court held that the purpose of the restitution
hearing is to restore to the victims of crime the value of what they lost rather
than to punish the wrongdoer.2 11 The evidentiary standard is the greater
weight of the evidence rather than the exclusion of all reasonable doubt.212
There is no requirement that the amount of the loss first be proven in the
criminal case at the misdemeanor level. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of
Florida held in Hebert v. State,213 that when an individual entered into a plea
agreement which left the trial court discretion as to the amount of restitution
the defendant waived any objection to the amount of the restitution absent
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 668 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 677 So. 2d 840 (Fla.
1996).
209. Id. at 1083.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1085.
212. Id.
213. 614 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1993).
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abuse of discretion.214 The court in J.O.S. recognized that the issue before
the court was unanswered in Hebert, and therefore, it certified the question
to the Supreme Court of Florida.215
The technical question of whether an order of adjudication is a final
order in a juvenile delinquency case and thus appealable was recently before
the Third District Court of Appeal in A.N. v. State.216 In that case, the child
sought to appeal from an adjudication of delinquency in the circuit court in
Dade County when the case was transferred for disposition to Broward
County.217 The third district held that the adjudication order was a non-
appealable, non-final order, and that there was no appealable final order in a
delinquency case until a disposition order was entered.218 The appellate
court recognized that the right of the child to appeal a final order in a
delinquency case was created by statute but that the statute did not itself
define a final order.219 The court in A.N. relied upon an earlier appellate
opinion of T.L.W. v. Soud,220 which held that judicial "labor" ends upon
entry of an order of disposition in a delinquency case and that this point in
time establishes the test of finality for purposes of determining an appealable
final order.221 The appeal in A.N. was thus dismissed.2 2
The Fourth District Court of Appeal has ruled in a very brief opinion on
the limit of the ability of the State to appeal from a dispositional order. In
State v. C. W.2 23 the court held that the State may not appeal from a juvenile
court order denying restitution.224 Under the Florida Juvenile Code, there is
no provision comparable to that existing in the adult criminal code, which
allows the State to appeal.2m Thus, the failure to order restitution is not on a
list of orders from which the State may appeal in a juvenile proceeding, and
the failure to order restitution does not constitute an illegal sentence.226
214. Id. at 494.
215. J.O.S., 668 So. 2d at 1085.
216. 666 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
217. Id. at 929.
218. Iaat 930.
219. Id.
220. 645 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
221. Id. at 1104-05.
222. A.N., 666 So. 2d at 930.
223. 662 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
224. Id. at 769.
225. Id. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.069(1)(b), 39.0711, 775.09, 924.07(1)(k) (1995).
226. C.W., 662 So. 2d at 769 (citing State v. Maclead, 600 So. 2d 1096, 1098 (Fla.
1992)).
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Therefore, the appellate court had no jurisdiction to consider the appeal by
the State.227
F. Legislation and Rule Changes
The Florida Legislature did not make many changes in the juvenile code
this year relating to juvenile justice. However, one important change is in
the area of the transfer of a child for prosecution as an adult at section
39.052.28 A new subsection (f) requires the State Attorney to file an
information if a child, regardless of age at the time of the alleged offense, is
alleged to have committed a theft of a motor vehicle which, while the child
is in possession of the stolen vehicle, causes serious bodily injury or death to
a person who is not involved in the underlying offense.22 9 In other words,
the legislature has decided that a child of any age shall be treated as an adult
for criminal trial purposes whenever there is a vehicular theft resulting in
serious bodily injury or death. This continues the clear trend in the Florida
Legislature to deal with juveniles as adults rejecting either the medical
model or the restorative justice model of the juvenile court. The statute
became law without the Governor's approval on May 25, 1996, to become
effective on October 1, 1996.230
A second change in the criminal law makes it unlawful for any student
under eighteen in any school to smoke tobacco in, on, or within 1000 feet of
school property between 6:00 a.m. and midnight.2 31 The maximum penalty
is twenty-five dollars or fifty hours of community service or completion of
232an anti-tobacco program.
In Amendment to Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.100(a),33 the
Supreme Court of Florida recently ruled on a proposed amendment to the
Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure.234 The amendment was to allow a pilot
project, which would utilize electronic audio-visual devices during juvenile
detention hearings, as is done in adult criminal cases.235 Over the dissents of
227. Id.
228. Ch. 96-234, § 1, 1996 Fla. Laws 627, 627 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.052(3)).
229. Id. § 1, 1996 Fla. Laws at 629 (creating FLA. STAT. § 39.052(3)(a)5f).
230. Id §§ 1, 2, 1996 FIa. Laws at 630.
231. Ch. 96-217, § 1, 1996 Fla. Laws 588, 588 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
386.212(1)).
232. Id. § 1, 1996 Fla. Laws at 588 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 386.212(3)).
233. 667 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1996).
234. Id at 197.
235. Id at 196.
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Justices Anstead and Kogan,2 6 the court approved a one year pilot program
to allow juveniles to attend detention hearings via audio-video devices
authorized by the chief judge in each of the petitioning circuits.2 7 Justice
Anstead objected, explaining that the juvenile court's role is unique in that
the focus is on helping children and not on the adversarial system's usual
fixation on winning.23 Justice Anstead also cited to the comments and
recommendations of the Florida Bar Juvenile Court Rules Committee which
opposed the change in the rule on grounds of due process and evidentiary
entitlements.239 In sum, Justice Anstead argued in favor of in-person
hearings contending that both good public policy and constitutional and
statutory protections mitigated against audio-visual detention hearings.240
III. DEPENDENCY AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Criminal Child Abuse and Neglect
In 1993, the Florida Legislature introduced section 827.05 which
created a misdemeanor criminal offense proscribing negligent treatment of
children.241 In State v. Mincey,242 the Supreme Court of Florida held that.the
statute was unconstitutional. 243 The court relied upon its 1977 decision in
State v. Winters,244 in which it had ruled that a similar negligent treatment of
children statute was unconstitutionally vague, indefinite, and overbroad. 245
The Mincey court found that the new statute made several changes by adding
some language to the old law but that it did not clarify the kind of conduct to
246be prohibited. As a result, the changes did not correct the vagueness
problem recognized in the Winters decision which was the failure to give
parents and others susceptible to child abuse charges fair notice of the type
of behavior which would subject them to criminal sanctions.247
236. Id. at 197-98 (Anstead & Kogan, JJ., dissenting).
237. Id. at 197.
238. Amendment, 667 So. 2d at 198 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 197 n.3.
240. Id. at 197-98 nn. 3-4.
241. FLA. STAT. § 827.05 (1993).
242. 672 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1996).
243. Id. at 526.
244. 346 So. 2d 991 (Ma. 1977).
245. Id. at 994.
246. Mincey, 672 So. 2d at 526.
247. Id
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B. Dependency Issues
The Florida courts have held that a finding of dependency can be made
against one parent and not the other. The question before the appellate court
in Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. P.H.,248 was whether
a finding of dependency can be predicated upon proof of neglect by only one
parent.249 The court of appeal held that it could 250 although the opinion is
unclear in several respects. The trial court had found that a prima facie case
of present neglect had been proved as to the mother but not as to the fa-
ther.2'5 The trial court then decided that an adjudication of dependency
required proof of current or prospective abuse, neglect, or abandonment, as
25225to both parents. Thus, the court dismissed the petition for dependency.2 3
The appellate court quite properly said that this was error.254 The Florida
Statutes can be read to allow a finding of dependency by one parent. For
example, the juvenile code provides six different grounds for a finding of
dependency including: 1) abandonment, abuse, or neglect; 2) surrender for
adoption; 3) voluntary placement and failure to comply with a case plan; 4)
voluntary placement for the purpose of subsequent adoption; 5) lack of a
parent, legal custodian, or responsible adult relative to provide supervision
and care; and 6) a substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect by the
parent, parents, or custodian.255 The statute speaks in the singular and plural.
At several points in the section of the law defining dependent children,
reference is made to parents in the plural. Furthermore, at another section of
chapter 39 regarding the filing of petitions for dependency, the statute
currently provides that the petition need not contain allegations of acts or
omissions by both parents.256 However, what seems to have happened in the
P.H. case is that the non-custodial father failed to accept responsibility for
the protection, maintenance, and care of his children and failed to request
custody of the children despite being apprised of the mother's neglect. Thus,
the appellate court concluded that HRS presented a prima facie case with
248. 659 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
249. Id. at 1377.
250. Id. at 1379.
251. Id. at 1377.
252. Id.
253. P.H., 659 So. 2d at 1377.
254. Id. at 1379.
255. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(14).
256. See id. § 39.404(3)(c) (1995).
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respect to the father's neglect and prospective neglect of the children. s7
Thus, there appears to have been neglect by both parents in the opinion of
the appellate court.~ Then and it is unclear why, the court concluded that a
finding of dependency as to a second parent can be predicated upon proof of
neglect by one parent.2 9 If all the appellate court meant by this statement is
that there can be a finding of dependency as to one parent and there need not
be a finding of dependency as to both parents, then the opinion makes sense.
The prior case law cited in the P.H. opinion supports the proposition that a
finding of neglect can be made against one parent but not the other.260 But
what if the court is saying that a finding of dependency as to one parent can
be transferred to a second parent without an independent basis of depend-
ency being found as to the second parent. Then, clearly, such a holding
constitutes a denial of due process. Here the dependency petition alleged
that the father was unable to protect the children, and neither parent provided
emotionally or financially for the children. This would give adequate notice
to the father and could allow the trial court, as well as the appellate court, to
conclude that there was a prima facie case with respect to the father's
neglect and prospective neglect of the children.
In an analogous situation, a mother brought a writ of certiorari chal-
lenging a circuit court order approving a performance agreement which
included tasks related to a child who had not been adjudicated dependent.
The appellate court in J.V. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services,26 1 held that it was error to include obligations related to a new baby
who had not been the subject of the dependency proceeding in a perform-
ance agreement.262 The court noted that the Florida Statutes require that the
problems or conditions which are the basis for the adjudication of depend-
ency are to be included in the performance agreement 263 referred to as a plan
under current law. The court further noted that the agreement must be
designed to address the facts and circumstances upon which the court based
257. P.H., 659 So. 2d at 1379.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See C.F. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 649 So. 2d 295, 296
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that dependency can be found as to independent acts by
each parent); In re L.S., 592 So. 2d 802, 802 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing that a
dependency adjudication can be against one parent based upon the amendment to section
39.01(10) of the Florida Statutes in 1990 to include the single parent).
261. 661 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
262. Id. at 1265.
263. Id. at 1264 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.451(3)(d) (1993)).
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the finding of dependency in involuntary placements. 64 In J. V., the appel-
late court concluded that the problems which gave rise to the dependency
were in no way related to the new baby.265 In addition, the court appears to
have concluded that the new baby had not been declared dependent. Thus,
Padgett v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services,266 the Supreme
Court of Florida case which held that proof of abuse or neglect as to one
child may form the basis for an adjudication as to the parents' rights to
267
another child, was inapposite. In J.V., there had been no effort to declare
the new baby dependent. Thus, for both reasons, the appellate court quashed
the order approving the performance agreement in part to the extent that the
tasks included those related solely to the unadjudicated child.268
Since the Supreme Court of Florida opinion in Padgett, cases have
regularly come to the appellate courts on the issue of the proper interpreta-
tion of the doctrine of "prospective neglect." 269 The test for prospective
neglect was recently employed by the appellate court in Denson v. Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services2 70 over a dissent demonstrating
the factual difficulties inherent in the test.271 In Denson, the father had been
adjudicated as having sexually abused a child. Based on that finding, a
dependency adjudication was made as to three other stepchildren. The
appellate court in Denson held that under Padgett there must be a two-part
finding that first, there was proof of neglect or abuse of another child and
second, the child who was the subject of the current proceeding is at
"substantial risk" of suffering imminent abuse or neglect if left in the
custody of the parent.272 The showing is based on proof that the parent
suffers from a condition that makes the prospect of future abuse or neglect of
the other child highly probable. 3 The dissent simply stated that the respon-
264. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.451(6)(b)5).
265. Id. at 1265.
266. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
267. J. V., 661 So. 2d at 1265 (explaining why Padgett does not apply).
268. Id.
269. See Dale, supra note 1, at 211-12; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1991 Survey of
Florida Law, 16 NOVA L. REv. 333, 368-73 (1991).
270. 661 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
271. IeL at 936 (Dauksch, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 935.
273. Id. See also Richmond v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 658 So.
2d 176 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Palmer v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Servs., 547 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), cause dismissed, 553 So. 2d 1166 (Fla.
1989).
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dent father was a proven molester and the evidence was sufficient to support
the determination of the trial court.
27 4
The Florida courts have held on a number of occasions that the trial
court's ability to order HRS to pay for various services in dependency
proceedings is quite limited. The issue came up again this year in Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Platt.275 In Platt, as part of a
dependency proceeding the court on its own motion ordered each of the
parents to submit to a psychological evaluation within thirty days but failed
to articulate who was to pay for such evaluations. 276 When the psycholo-
gist's bill remained unpaid the court ordered HRS to make payment.
Relying upon earlier case law which appeared to have been on point,277 and
its further findings of an absence of specific statutory authority, and a
constitutional right on the part of the parent to such services, the court held
that the parent, and not HRS, is responsible for the payment of the serv-
ices. 278 The court did not answer the question of whether HRS is responsible
for the obligation if a parent is found to be indigent following a hearing on
that issue.
Another dependency related issue going to the limits of authority of the
court involves the question of whether the court may require a mother who
had given birth to three cocaine dependent children to undergo bi-monthly
pregnancy testing. In T.H. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services,279 the appellate court held that, while it shared the concern of the
trial court about the impact of drug use during pregnancy, and that, while it
agreed that exposure to drugs is of great public and legal concern, the court
could find nothing in chapter 39 giving the court the authority to enter such
an order.28°
An interesting issue of the jurisdiction of the juvenile division of the
circuit court in dependency matters came up recently in Friedland v. De-
274. Denson, 661 So. 2d at 936 (Dauksch, J., dissenting). For a detailed analysis of the
doctrine of prospective neglect, as applied in Padgett, and the two-part test that has been
developed by the trial court subsequent thereto, see Smith v. Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Servs., 665 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (Sharp, J., dissenting).
275. 675 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
276. Id. at 141.
277. See Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Ortiz, 627 So. 2d 124 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993). See also In re J.W., 591 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991);
Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1994 Survey of Florida Law, 19 NOVA L. REv. 139, 143
(1994) (discussing Ortiz).
278. Platt, 675 So. 2d at 142.
279. 661 So. 2d 403 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
280. Id. at 404.
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partment of Health and Rehabilitative Services.281 In that case, upon the
dismissal of a dependency petition with prejudice, the trial court did not
order the children to be returned home. 82 One child traveled to Massachu-
setts to reside with his maternal aunt while the other returned home. The
parents brought a habeas corpus petition seeking enforcement of the dis-
missal and the trial court concluded it had no jurisdiction. HRS argued that
the court lacked jurisdiction to order return of the child because of the
dismissal. The appellate court held that the trial court had inherent jurisdic-
tion to impose its own orders, that the trial court failed to provide for
terminating its jurisdiction in the order, and that the order could have no
other purpose but to authorize return of the child to the parents.283 Accord-
ingly, the appellate court reversed.284
C. Right to Counsel Issues
In prior surveys, this author has urged that Florida's statute limiting the
right to counsel for parents in dependency proceedings be amended to
provide free counsel to indigent parents in all dependency proceedings as is
done in other states.285 The right to counsel section of the Florida Statutes
provides that a poor parent is not entitled to a lawyer free of cost in a
dependency case, although he or she must be notified of the right to counsel,
and if termination is likely, a lawyer at no cost shall then be appointed.286
Florida does provide an absolute right to counsel, including counsel for an
indigent parent in all termination of parental rights cases, by statute.287 This
non-absolute right to counsel system in dependency proceedings was
adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida in In re D.B.288 in 1980, when the
court held that counsel shall be provided in a dependency case only "where
permanent termination or child abuse charges might result. '289 For the past
281. 661 So. 2d 1286 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
282. Id. at 1287.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See Dale, supra note 277, at 144.
286. See FLA. STAT. § 39.406 (1995); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.320; Davis v. Page, 714 F.2d 512,
515-18 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Davis v. Gladstone, 464 U.S. 1052 (1984); In
re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
287. See FLA. STAT. § 39.465(1)(a) (1995).
288. 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
289. Id. at 91.
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fifteen years, the trial courts have had ongoing and repeated problems
complying with this imprecise test.y
Wofford v. Eid291 is a recent example of this problem. In that case, HRS
filed a petition for adjudication of dependency and several hearings were
held, culminating in a dispositional order adjudicating the child dependent.
At all these hearings, the court advised the mother of the right to seek
counsel. At a subsequent hearing approving a case plan, the court did not
advise the mother of her right to counsel. Nor did it do so at several subse-
quent hearings. Ultimately, HRS filed a petition for termination of parental
rights. At an initial hearing on termination, the trial court conducted the
hearing without appointing counsel and without advising the mother of her
right to counsel but thereafter did appoint counsel. The trial court subse-
quently became concerned that the mother had not received adequate notice
of her right to counsel at prior hearings and entered an order dismissing
IRS' petition for termination of parental rights on the basis of lack of advice
of her right to counsel.292 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's
ruling that the mother had not been afforded an appropriate level of due
process protection regarding the right to counsel and on that basis affirmed
the dismissal of the petition.293 However, to the extent that the termination
of parental rights petition was premised upon grounds wholly independent of
the constitutionally flawed dependency proceeding, in which there was no
counsel, the appellate court reversed, thus allowing the proceeding to
continue.2
94
The appellate court's discussion of the failure to appoint counsel in
Wofford is significant. The court held that whenever a dependency petition
states a ground for a finding of dependency contained in section
39.464(1)(d) involving "egregious" conduct by the parent that endangers the
life, health, or safety of the child or the child's sibling, such an allegation
generates potential for the ultimate termination of parental rights.295 There-
fore, counsel must be appointed and the failure to do so is reversible error.
296
Similarly, the court held that in a separate situation, where the act of a parent
entering into a case plan and then failing to substantially comply with the
290. See Dale, supra note 277, at 144.
291. 671 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
292. Id. at 861.
293. Id. at 863.
294. Id.
295. Maat 862.
296. Wofford, 671 So. 2d at 862.
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terms within twelve months generates a termination proceeding, the conse-
quences are the same as a dependency adjudication containing findings of
egregious abuse.297 Here, too, counsel must be appointed. Thus, the holding
in Wofford conveys that pursuant to two of the chapter 39 grounds for
termination of parental rights, counsel must be appointed at the dependency
stage.298 It remains to be seen whether other district courts of appeal or trial
courts will follow this holding. As noted previously, another simpler and
more expedient resolution of this entire matter is to have an absolute right to
counsel established statutorily in Florida. Asking the appellate courts to
parse the statute for entitlements and evaluate diverse cases on their facts at
a later date is hardly an efficient way to protect the constitutional rights of
parents.
Even when the court properly notifies the parent about the right to
counsel in a dependency proceeding the parents' waiver of counsel must be
made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 299 The issue of how to
evaluate waiver of counsel came up recently in McKenzie v. Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services.300 In that case, at arraignment, the
mother initially consented to the petition. But when questioned by the court
to determine if she understood that she was giving up the right to an attor-
ney, she then requested an attorney. At the end of the arraignment, she
requested that an attorney be appointed and one indeed was appointed to
represent her at future hearings. The appellate court noted that the mother
displayed hesitation and confusion when entering her plea of consent.30' She
requested counsel twice during the arraignment because she did not under-
stand the nature of the dependency hearings, and specifically, she did not
understand the right that she was relinquishing. The court concluded that
once the mother stated that she did not understand the proceedings and that
she was confused, the inquiry as to consent should have stopped and an
attorney should have been appointed immediately to represent her.
302
An important question in termination cases is whether the parent ought
to have the right to counsel on appeal. Termination cases are civil in nature,
not criminal. Therefore, the right to counsel in a criminal appeal, as enunci-
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. See Courtney v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 667 So. 2d 504
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
300. 663 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
301. Id. at 683.
302. Id.
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ated by the United States Supreme Court in Anders v. California,0 3 would
not appear to apply. In Ostrum v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services,304 the attorney for an appellant father whose parental rights had
been terminated, filed a motion on appeal to withdraw accompanied by an
Anders brief.305 The father had been convicted of two counts of capital
sexual battery of his own minor children and sentenced to two life terms
with minimum mandatory terms of twenty-five years on each count to run
consecutively. Thus, he would not be released from prison until after his
children reached the age of majority. HRS brought a termination proceeding
and counsel was appointed for the father. The attorney presented no evi-
dence, and the appellant father declined an opportunity to be present at the
hearing. In ruling on the withdrawal motion, the appellate court held first
that while parents are entitled to appointed counsel at the public's expense in
termination cases, the right is generated by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and not the Sixth Amendment. 30 6 Therefore, Anders
does not apply because it only applies in criminal cases. 3° The court held
that on a practical level the Anders protection, which involved the filing of a
brief by counsel, detailing the proceedings below with a discussion of where
error might be suggested and why none actually appears, is unnecessary in
light of the need for the children to have finality as soon as possible.08
Thus, the court held that all that will be necessary in a termination case is for
appellant's counsel to file a motion seeking leave to withdraw as counsel for
the parent whose rights had been terminated.30 9 The appellant parent will
then be given time in which to argue the case without an attorney. 310 If the
parent then fails to file a brief in a timely fashion, the court will conclude
that the parent does not wish to prosecute the appeal and the court will
dismiss for failure to prosecute.31' If a brief is filed, the court will review it
and if it finds no preliminary basis for reversal, the court will summarily
303. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
304. 663 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
305. Id. at 1361.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Ostrum, 663 So. 2d at 1361.
310. Id. The parent could obtain new counsel although the court does not mention this
alternative.
311. Id.
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affirm pursuant to rule 9.315.312 Otherwise, the case will proceed as any
ordinary appeal.313
D. Guardian Ad Litem Issues
Previous surveys have discussed the fact that a child does not have an
absolute right to counsel in a dependency proceeding in Florida.31 4 How-
ever, because Florida participates in the Federal Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act of 1974 ("CAPT'A"), the State must provide a guardian ad
litem on behalf of children in dependency proceedings. 315 The precise role
of the guardian ad litem and the procedures under which one operates have
been the subject of substantial appellate court analysis in recent years.31 6
The duties of the guardian ad litem are governed by an amalgam of stat-
utes, 317 court rules,318 unpublished supreme court orders, 319 and case law.
In a significant and rather startling opinion, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal in Fisher v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services,320
recently held that the trial court did not commit fundamental error when the
guardian ad litem appointed for the child failed to serve the entirety of the
case.321 The appellate court found that after the voluntary guardian resigned,
the trial court had entered repeated orders attempting to have a guardian ad
litem appointed by the Guardian Ad Litem Program; however, no guardian
was ever appointed.322 Furthermore, the court noted that the former guardian
312. l
313. Id.
314. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1992 Survey of Florida, 17 NOVA L. REv. 335,
369-70 (1992).
315. See 42 U.S.C. § 5105 (1988).
316. See In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 91 (Fla. 1980); Simms v. State, 641 So. 2d 957 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); In re Adoption of T.G.L., 606 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1992); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Coskey, 599 So. 2d 153, 157 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Brevard County v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs.,
589 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Brevard County v. Lanford, 588 So. 2d 669
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Marion County v. Johnson, 586 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1991); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cole, 574 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
317. See FLA. STAT. § § 39.461, .465, 61.401, .403,415.508 (1995).
318. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.215.
319. See Guardian Ad Litem Program Standards of Operation, Fla. S. Ct. Amended Ad-
min. Order (November 27, 1995); Guardian Ad Litem Program Minimal Standards of
Operation, Fla. S. Ct. Admin. Order (Feb. 7, 1995).
320. 674 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
321. Id. at 208.
322. Id.
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ad litem did testify at the termination hearing between six and seven months
after resigning, and the court recommended that parental rights be termi-
nated.32 The court found no fundamental error.324 The court reasoned that
there was an absence of a showing that the child's rights were not adequately
protected by the court, HRS, or the foster parents, and that the guardian ad
litem had represented the interests of the child through a substantial portion
of the case.3 5 The appellate court concluded that the continued service of
the guardian would not have changed the outcome of the case.326
The court in Fisher relied heavily on a 1994 opinion from the Second
District Court of Appeal in In re E.F.,327 in which the court held that a trial
court does not commit fundamental error if it attempts but is unable to locate
a volunteer guardian ad litem.3  In E.F., a mother appealed from an order
terminating parental rights since the child never received the assistance of a
guardian ad litem.329 The appellate court upheld the termination in the
absence of a guardian ad litem because, as it explained:
Although both the legislature and the supreme court have mandated
the use of guardians ad litem in parental termination proceedings,
our state has never implemented a program to provide an adequate
supply of guardians. The program is primarily staffed by volun-
teers. At a time when the supply of [guardians] is exceeded by the
demands of children who would benefit from guardians, we cannot
hold that a trial court commits fundamental error if it attempts, but
is unable, to locate a volunteer guardian ad litem.
330
There are several problems with the holdings in Fisher and E.F. First,
the federal statute under which Florida is obligated to provide a Guardian Ad
Litem Program is not a discretionary statute.331 It requires appointment of
guardians ad litems. Furthermore, while the Florida courts have not held
that a child has a right to counsel in a dependency or termination proceeding,
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Fisher, 674 So. 2d at 208.
326. Id.
327. 639 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
328. a d at 640.
329. Id at 642.
330. Id. at 640.
331. See 42 U.S.C. § 5105 (1988).
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they have recognized the significance of advocacy on behalf of the child.332
In addition, the Florida Statutes do not render the appointment and involve-
ment of the guardian ad litem discretionary, but rather, they mandate
appointment.333  The court's rejection of federal and state mandatory
statutory provisions is without explanation other than that no harm resulted.
This rejection of the mandatory obligation does not square with other case
law, where mandatory obligations have been enforced even though their
enforcement would not affect the outcome of the case.334
In addition, the holding in Fisher is hard to apply in practice. The
opinion suggests that if the trial court concludes that a guardian ad litem will
not be of any benefit to the child and the result in all likelihood will be
appropriate in any event, it need not worry about a guardian ad litem
appointment. This is a very difficult test for the appellate court to evaluate,
after the fact, on appeal. There is no standard of review. Furthermore, the
absence of information in the record which the guardian ad litem would
generate cannot be opined by the appellate court because there will rarely be
anything in front of it in the record on appeal.
Finally, in Gordon v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
("Gordon I1'),335 the appellate court approved the trial court's entry of a
"cost judgment"336 in favor of the guardian ad litem as prevailing party and
against the parents in a dependency and termination of parental rights
case.337 The Third District Court of Appeal had previously held in the same
case in an earlier reported decision, Gordon v. Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services ("Gordon 6,), 338 that Florida law did not require the
court to assess costs in such cases against HRS. 339 The court held in Gordon
II that the trial court did have discretion to enter such an order against the
parents on the basis of the prior ruling in Gordon I, and that it had the
discretion to enter such an order against HRS. 340 The court noted that by
332. See In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980); Simms v. State, 641 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing that the significance of the guardian ad litem's position may
differ from that of HRS).
333. See FLA. STAT. § 39.465(2)(a).
334. See discussion supra p. 208 (concerning A.P. v. State, 666 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1995)).
335. 674 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
336. FLA. STAT. § 57.031 (1995).
337. Gordon, 674 So. 2d at 841.
338. 637 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
339. Id. at 948-49 (citing FLA. STAT. § 57.041 (1993)).
340. Gordon, 674 So. 2d at 841 (citing Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v.
A.F., 528 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
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statute Florida provides that financially able parents shall pay the costs of
guardian ad litem services.341
E. Termination of Parental Rights
The Fifth District Court of Appeal recently ruled that adjudicatory
hearings, even in the context of termination of parental rights, must comply
with the rules of evidence applicable in civil cases. In Lewis v. Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services,342 the actions of the trial court were
startling. At the end of an evidentiary hearing for termination of parental
rights, the court, unbeknownst to the mother, ordered the guardian ad litem
and HRS to make unannounced visits to the home where the mother had
been staying.343 The mother led a nomadic life style, and the court was
concerned about her residence and employment. The guardian ad litem and
HRS made the visit, took photographs, and filed supplemental reports which
concluded that the home was not a good environment for the mother and
child. The reports were not provided to the mother or her attorney until the
day of the final adjudicatory hearing. Incredibly, the court did not allow the
mother to offer testimony to refute the contents of the report or to cross
examine the guardian ad litem or the HRS counselor because, as the appel-
late court described it, the trial court did not want to reopen the case. 344 The
trial court then entered a detailed order terminating parental rights, relying
upon the supplemental report.345
The mother appealed, arguing among other things that the adjudication
and disposition should be reversed because the trial court took into consid-
eration supplemental reports and photographs and did not allow her an
opportunity to cross examine.346 The appellate court reversed first on the
basis of the statute which requires a written guardian ad litem report to be
provided to all parties and the court at least forty-eight hours before the
dispositional hearing.347 The appellate court noted the obvious purpose is to
allow the parents to contest the report.348 Second, the use of hearsay evi-
dence to terminate parental rights denied the mother due process.349 Under
341. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 415.508(2) (1995).
342. 670 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
343. l at 1193.
344. Id
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Lewis, 670 So. 2d at 1193; see FLA. STAT. § 39.465(2)(b)(1).
348. Lewis, 670 So. 2d at 1193.
349. Id.
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Florida law during the adjudicatory hearing, a trial court is required to apply
the "'rules of evidence used in civil cases.' ,350 The evidence has to be
admissible.35 1 This evidence was rank hearsay.352 Furthermore, it is a denial
of due process to prohibit the right to cross examine.353 The mother's second
argument on appeal, which the appellate court did not have to reach, was the
denial of the right to counsel.354 It turns out that at the dispositional hearing
the mother's lawyer telephoned the court to say she was unavoidably
detained and asked that the hearing be continued until she could arrive. The
trial court had conducted the hearing without the mother's attorney and
entered an order of disposition.355 Enough said.
In a recent opinion from the Second District Court of Appeal, the
question was whether the Florida Statutes allow for termination of parental
rights of either parent where only one of the parents commits abuse.356
Conceptually, the issue is the same as that raised in Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services v. P.H.357 In In re A. C.,358 a termination pro-
ceeding against two parents was based upon allegations that the mother had
shaken the child and caused significant head injuries to the youngster.359
The trial court found that the father was at work at the time and thus, the
termination petition as to him was denied. The trial court then held that it
could not terminate parental rights when the severe and continuing abuse or
neglect and/or egregious abuse or neglect was found to be committed by
only one parent. 360 The appellate court held that chapter 39 does not
preclude institution of a termination proceeding against one parent where the
other parent would be a satisfactory replacement. 361 The language of the
statute provides for termination where "[t]he parent or parents" have
engaged in severe or continuing abuse or neglect or egregious abuse.362 The
court therefore reversed.363
350. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.467(5) (1993)).
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Lewis, 670 So. 2d at 1194.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. In re A.C., 660 So. 2d 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
357. 659 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995). See discussion supra pp. 214-19.
358. 660 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
359. Id. at 331.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 332.
362. Id. at 331 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.464(3) (Supp. 1992)).
363. A.C., 660 So. 2d at 332.
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The Florida termination of parental rights statute contains five items
which must be established by clear and convincing evidence before there can
be an adjudication that parental rights should be terminated. 364 These items
are: 1) the child was adjudicated dependent; 2) a dispositional order was
entered; 3) the parent was informed of his right to counsel in the dependency
proceeding; 4) the best interests of the child would be served by granting the
petition; and 5) at least one of the grounds in section 39.464 of the Florida
Statutes has been met.365
The issue before the court in Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services v. N.T.,366 was whether the failure to incorporate findings of fact in
the dependency adjudication requires the court to dismiss the subsequent
termination proceeding. 367  The appellate court held that the technical
insufficiency of a dependency order to set forth findings of fact is not
reversible error in a termination case.368 The court held that the adjudication
369of dependency requirement is satisfied by the mere fact of adjudication.
There is nothing in the statutory language that precludes termination of
parental rights when the dependency order fails to set forth factual findings
as to the basis for dependency.370
F. Appellate Issues
The Florida courts have held that an adjudicatory order in a dependency
proceeding is not appealable. It is premature, and an appeal in a dependency
case must come from a dispositional order.37 1 In a recent decision from the
Fifth District Court of Appeal in Moore v. Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services,372 the court held that because the statutory scheme
for termination of parental rights contemplates entry of two orders, the
second or dispositional order is the final order for purposes of appeal.
373
364. FLA. STAT. § 39.4611 (1995).
365. Id.
366. 670 So. 2d 1147 (Fa. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
367. Id. at 1148.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id
371. See In re T.M., 622 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 630 So. 2d
1103 (Fla. 1993); see also In re T.M., 614 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
372. 664 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
373. Id. at 1139.
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G. Legislation and Rule Changes
The Supreme Court of Florida amended the Florida Rules of Juvenile
Procedure in the fall of 1995 to make changes that comply with language in
the statutes governing performance agreements in dependency cases. The
statute, and now the court rules, provide for the development and imple-
mentation of "case plans" previously known as "performance agree-
ments."374 The court also changed the procedure for initiating petitions for
termination of parental rights so that they may be filed in time and that the
guardian ad litem is listed among the entities and persons who may file a
petition.375 The court rules also contain a new provision providing that in
termination of parental rights cases, the parties may stipulate, or the court
may order that parties or relatives of the parent whose rights have been
terminated may maintain contact with the child.376
IV. CONCLUSION
Extensive changes to the Florida Juvenile Code in both the juvenile
delinquency and child dependency areas, which have been the norm in the
Florida Legislature until last year, did not take place this year. Thus, the
courts will have an opportunity to analyze statutes which have been on the
books for two years without dramatic change. This should be helpful.
Unfortunately, the appellate courts have had to spend much of their
time correcting simple, yet repeated errors by the trial courts. However, the
appellate courts have also rendered valuable services interpreting sections of
chapter 39 with specific emphasis on the dispositional stage of delinquency
cases and termination of parental rights. A particularly difficult area, as yet
not fully developed by the appellate courts, involves questions of the right
to counsel for parents in dependency and termination proceedings and the
role of the guardian ad litem in the same proceedings.
Finally, although the Florida Legislature was busy restructuring Part IV
of chapter 39 dealing with families in need of services and children in need
374. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.400-.410.
375. Id. at 8.500(b)(1).
376. Id. at 8.530(d).
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of services, 3 " there has been virtually no reported appellate case law in the
field. Indeed, there was nothing to report this past year.
377. See 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-369 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.426(2)); 1996 Fla. Laws
ch. 96-398 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.42(1), (5), (7)). The changes in chapter 96-369 of the
Laws of Florida deals with subsection two of section 39.426 of the Florida Statutes entitled
"Case staffing; services and treatment to a family in need of services." The changes amended
the composition of the case staffing committee and provided that the committee may include a
supervisor of the Department's contracted provider, a representative from the area of
substance abuse, the alternative sanctions coordinator, and a representative from the child's
school. See ch. 96-369, § 4, 1996 Fla. Laws 2128, 2133.
Additionally, chapter 96-398 of the Laws of Florida restructured the children in need of
services and families in need of services section of chapter 39 by identifying the roles of the
DJJ and HRS (effective January 1997, the Department of Children and Family Services) as
they apply to preserving the unity and integrity of the family and in serving this country's
youth population. See ch. 96-398, §§ 19-34, 1996 Fla. Laws 2505, 2539-53.
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